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JUSTIFICATION FOR POLICE INTRUSIONS 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
 
People v. Loretta1 
(decided June 18, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Delbart Loretta was convicted of criminal possession of a 
controlled substance in the fifth degree.2  Loretta was observed plac-
ing an aluminum foil object in his pocket, which was subsequently 
determined to be drugs.3  The Supreme Court of New York, Appel-
late Division, First Department, in denying Loretta’s suppression mo-
tion, held that the police conduct “constituted a level-two common-
law inquiry,”4 based upon Loretta’s nervous mannerisms, the fact that 
the stop was within a “drug-prone neighborhood,” and Loretta’s at-
tempt to block the officers’ view of his pocket.5  Accompanying a 
lawful level two common law inquiry is the officers’ right to “ask[ ] 
more pointed questions.”6  In other words, the officers may ask ques-
tions in an effort to “gain explanatory information.”7 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The arresting detective observed Loretta placing what the of-
ficer believed was drug packaging into his shirt pocket.8  The detec-
tive, recognizing he was located within a “drug-prone neighborhood,” 
 
1 People v. Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013). 




6 People v. Kennebrew, 965 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013). 
7 Tillie S. Mirman, Search and Seizure: New York vs. Federal Approach, 28 TOURO L. 
REV. 751, 757 (2012). 
8 Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 1. 
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had reason to believe that the aluminum foil object that Loretta 
placed into his shirt pocket was drug paraphernalia.9  Two police of-
ficers surrounded Loretta, and the arresting detective approached 
him.10  Loretta, upon the detective’s approach, immediately began 
exhibiting nervous mannerisms.11  It appeared that Loretta was also 
strategically using his hand to block the officers’ view of the pocket 
in which he had placed the aluminum foil.12  At this point, the detec-
tive, with great suspicion, told Loretta to stop moving his hand and 
asked him “if he had anything illegal or what he had in his pocket.”13  
The officers found drugs in Loretta’s possession, and he was later 
convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth 
degree.14 
III. REASONING 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.15 
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. De Bour,16 interpreted 
the Fourth Amendment and established a four-tier method to deter-
mine the constitutionality of police encounters and confrontations.17  
With each successive level, the officers may legally increase the level 






13 Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 1. 
14 Id. 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
16 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). 
17 Id. at 571-72. 
18 Id. 
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ments the officers must fulfill become more stringent.19 
In short, the court in Loretta held that the officers’ conduct 
constituted a level-two inquiry.20  The court reached its conclusion by 
distinguishing People v. Garcia.21  In Garcia, three officers pulled 
over the defendant’s vehicle after they observed a defect in the rear 
brake light.22  In total, there were five occupants in the vehicle.23  
When the officers approached the vehicle, “the three passengers in 
the rear seats ‘were a little furtive,’ kept ‘looking behind,’ [] ‘stiff-
ened up,’ . . . and ‘acted nervous.’ ”24  Following these observations, 
one of the officers asked the occupants if anyone in the vehicle had 
any weapons.25  One of the occupants responded and presented a 
knife.26  The officers then requested that the occupants exit the vehi-
cle, and the occupants complied.27  Following their exit, one of the 
officers spotted what he believed was “a gun or some sort of weapon” 
between the seats.28  The officers then searched the entire vehicle and 
found another weapon in the trunk.29  Subsequently, the weapons 
were determined to be only air-powered guns.30 
The court in Garcia held that the defendant’s conduct did not 
justify the actions the officer took under a level-two inquiry.31  The 
court believed that nervous mannerisms were not uncommon upon a 
police stop.32  In Loretta, however, the court found justification for a 
level-two inquiry by combining Loretta’s nervous characteristics with 
more telling circumstances, such as his location within a drug prone 
neighborhood and his attempt to block the officers’ sight of what was 
subsequently found to be drug packaging.33 
 
19 Id.  The requirements of each tier are discussed in detail later within this note.  See infra 
section V.A.3.i. 
20 Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 1. 
21 Id. at 1-2; People v. Garcia, 983 N.E.2d 259, 260 (N.Y. 2012). 










32 Garcia, 983 N.E.2d at 263. 
33 Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 2. 
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IV. FEDERAL APPROACH 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
tects persons against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”34  Typi-
cally, a search and seizure will violate the Fourth Amendment unless 
it is “based on probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant.”35  
The Supreme Court, however, has crafted certain exceptions to the 
probable cause and warrant requirement.36 
A. Terry v. Ohio 
In 1968, the Supreme Court, in Terry v. Ohio,37 recognized 
that some encounters between officers and persons are not seizures.38  
A forcible seizure occurs when an officer confronts an individual and 
deprives him of his ability to walk away.39  In Terry, Officer Martin 
McFadden observed two men, John Terry and Richard Chilton, 
standing on a street corner, acting in a way the officer believed was 
suspicious.40  McFadden watched as Terry and Chilton walked back 
and forth, always on the same route, peering into a store window.41  
Terry and Chilton repeated this pattern multiple times.42  Eventually, 
a third man, Katz, approached and had a brief conversation with both 
Terry and Chilton.43  At this point, Officer McFadden suspected both 
men of “casing a job [for] a stick-up.”44  He proceeded to follow Ter-
ry and Chilton until they rejoined Katz a few blocks from the store.45 
Officer McFadden approached all three men, identified him-
self, and asked for their names.46  After the men “mumbled some-
thing,” the officer patted Terry down and felt a pistol.47  He then or-
 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
35 Warrantless Searches and Seizures (Warrantless I), 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. 
PROC. 46 (2012). 
36 Id. 
37 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
38 Id. at 16. 
39 Id. at 16. 
40 Id. at 5. 
41 Id. at 5-6. 




46 Id. at 6-7. 
47 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. 
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dered all three men into a nearby store, removed Terry’s overcoat, 
and recovered the pistol.48 
The Supreme Court, in Terry, held that government interests, 
such as “crime prevention and detection,”49 justify “brief investigato-
ry stops”50 that are not seizures51 and, therefore, are based on “less 
than probable cause.”52  “[P]olice can stop and briefly detain a person 
for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion 
supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot’ . . 
. .”53  Reasonable suspicion demands “something more than an in-
choate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the 
level of suspicion required for probable cause.”54 
Generally, courts have required reasonable suspicion to be ob-
jectively reasonable.55  Courts have been very lenient and typically 
defer “to the observations and conclusions of the police, reasoning 
that an experienced officer can infer criminal activity from conduct 
that may seem innocuous to a lay observer.”56  However, when a 
court does find it necessary to review reasonable suspicion determi-
nations, it shall look at the “totality of the circumstances” to deter-
mine whether the officer had “particularized and objective basis” for 
suspecting criminal activity.57  Even activities and circumstances that 
alone would not appear suspicious must be reviewed, as a combina-
tion of “innocent activities may cumulatively create reasonable suspi-
cion.”58 
Along with investigatory stops, the Supreme Court, in Terry, 
also recognized the power of an officer to conduct a warrantless 
search.59  Like investigatory stops, the Supreme Court found that 
government interests, such as “the need for law enforcement officers 
to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence,” jus-
 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 22. 
50 Warrantless I, supra note 35, at 47. 
51 Terry, 392 U.S. at 8. 
52 Warrantless I, supra note 35, at 47. 
53 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
54 Id. at 2. 
55 Warrantless I, supra note 35, at 48. 
56 Id. at 51-52. 
57 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
58 Warrantless Searches and Seizures (Warrantless II), 90 GEO. L.J. 1130, 1134-35 
(2002). 
59 2 Joseph G. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 4:41 (3d 2013). 
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tify frisks absent probable cause.60  Evidence found as a result of the 
frisk cannot be used to prove the existence of reasonable suspicion.61 
Similar to the rule for investigatory stops, “[t]he standard for 
determining the need for a protective frisk is an objective one.”62  
This is because courts believe that subjective beliefs “have too little 
substance to effectively guarantee protection of constitutional 
rights.”63  While an officer does not need to be certain that a person is 
armed or dangerous, a reasonably prudent person under the same cir-
cumstances should conclude, like the officer, “that his or her safety or 
that of others was in danger . . . .”64  Because an officer’s life is po-
tentially at stake, courts have routinely kept the “test [for] sufficient 
suspicion” at a low threshold.65 
V. NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
The New York State Constitution protects persons from “un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”66  The four-tier approach to evalu-
ate police encounters with civilians,67 established by the New York 
Court of Appeals, is a product of over forty years of case law. 
A. New York’s “Stop and Frisk” Law: How it Shaped 
New York’s Current Search and Seizure 
Framework 
The New York Stop and Frisk law became effective July 1, 
1964.68  Following its most recent amendment in 2010, the statute, 
titled “Temporary questioning of persons in public places; search for 
weapons,” reads: 
1. In addition to the authority provided by this article 
for making an arrest without a warrant, a police officer 
 
60 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 





66 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
67 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72; People v. McIntosh, 755 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 2004); 
People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 205-06 (N.Y. 1992). 
68 Criminal Law—New York Authorizes Police to “Stop-and-Frisk” on Reasonable Suspi-
cion—N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, Ch. 86, § 2, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180(a)., 78 HARV. L. REV. 
473 (1964) [hereinafter New York Authorizes Police]. 
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may stop a person in a public place located within the 
geographical area of such officer’s employment when 
he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, 
has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felo-
ny or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and 
may demand of him his name, address and an explana-
tion of his conduct.  2. [Irrelevant to this discussion; 
deals with court officers]  3. When upon stopping a 
person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions 
one and two a police officer or court officer, as the 
case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger 
of physical injury, he may search such person for a 
deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance 
readily capable of causing serious physical injury and 
of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-
abiding persons.  If he finds such a weapon or instru-
ment, or any other property possession of which he 
reasonably believes may constitute the commission of 
a crime, he may take it and keep it until the comple-
tion of the questioning, at which time he shall either 
return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.  
4. [Irrelevant to this discussion; deals with storage and 
maintenance of data]69 
In short, the law permits a police officer to approach a person and ask 
investigatory questions when the officer has “specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”70  Furthermore, a police officer 
“who ‘reasonably suspects’ that he is in ‘danger of life or limb[,]’ 
may search the suspect for a dangerous weapon.”71 
1. Passage of New York’s Stop and Frisk Law 
At the request of the New York City Police Department,72 the 
stop and frisk bill was sponsored and submitted by the Mayor’s Leg-
 
69 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2013). 
70 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
71 New York Authorizes Police, supra note 68, at 473. 
72 John A. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York’s “Stop and Frisk” Law, 33 
FORDHAM L. REV. 211, 212 (1964). 
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islative representative, Julius Volker.73  The Bill was passed in 1964 
because case law was filled with conflicting theories and conclusions 
as to whether an arrest was made or whether “the process of investi-
gation was still underway.”74  One theory was that “[a]s soon as the 
defendant [believed] that his liberty [was] constrained, there [was] an 
arrest.”75  This theory led to a conflict between courts.76  Some courts 
favored the police department, finding that at nearly all times, proba-
ble cause existed, justifying an arrest.77  Other courts took a more 
conservative view, finding that in most instances, no probable cause 
existed, therefore, leading to illegal arrests78 and suppression of evi-
dence.79 
The conflicting theory “recognize[d] the possibility of a peri-
od of investigation and indicate[d] that it is the operation of the ar-
resting officer’s mind which determine[d] whether there was a tem-
porary detention or an arrest and the precise moment of the arrest.”80  
As a result, this theory relied on an officer’s subjective belief of 
probable cause based on the facts, circumstances, and situation.81 
Although given less weight, a second reason for the passage 
of the bill was its presentation as a “measure [] necessary to prevent 
crime.”82  Volker stated, “the police are charged with the duty not on-
 
73 Dasha Kabakova, The Lack of Accountability for the New York Police Department’s 
Investigative Stops, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 539, 542 (2012). 




78 Id.  See, e.g., People v. Moore, 183 N.E.2d 225, 226 (1962) (holding that the officer’s 
observation of four men handing money to the defendant was not indicative of a crime being 
committed and therefore led to an illegal arrest); People v. O’Connor, 178 N.E. 762, 762 
(1931) (holding that the arrest was made illegally because the officer had no right to search 
the prisoner, nor did the prisoner resist the officer or commit a crime). 
79 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 542.  See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
(“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution 
is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”); People v. Loria, 179 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1961) (“[The 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects] against ‘unreasonable governmental intru-
sion’ into the privacy of a person’s home, and any evidence discovered as a result of such an 
intrusion is now constitutionally tainted and inadmissible in a State court.”); People v. 
Brown, 225 N.Y.S.2d 157, 160 (1962) (holding that the arrest of the defendant was illegal 
because the officer did not know that the defendant had committed a burglary, nor the com-
mission of any felony, and therefore anything revealed by the search after the arrest may not 
be utilized against the defendant). 
80 Ronayne, supra note 72, at 212-13. 
81 Id. at 213. 
82 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 543. 
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ly of arresting criminals, but, equally, if not more important, of pre-
venting crime and preserving the peace.”83 
Predicting that the bill would draw scrutiny as potentially vio-
lating the Fourth Amendment, Volker argued that the bill required a 
“reasonable-man test.”84  In other words, Volker argued that the bill 
should avoid a constitutional challenge because the “detaining, ques-
tioning, and search” must be based on “reasonable grounds.”85  He 
further attempted to avoid a constitutional challenge by clarifying 
that the contemplated “average period of questioning a person would 
be no more than a few minutes.”86 
2. Early Challenges to New York’s Stop and 
Frisk Law 
During the Supreme Court’s 1967 term, the Court heard three 
cases in which it considered “the extent to which police may ‘seize’ 
and ‘search’ persons without a warrant.”87  The first case, Terry v. 
Ohio, is discussed in detail in the above sections of this note.88  
Sibron v. New York,89 and its companion case, Peters v. New York,90 
both failed to strike down New York’s Stop and Frisk law.91 
In Sibron, a police officer observed the defendant from 4:00 
P.M. to midnight converse with “six or eight persons” who the officer 
knew from his previous experiences were narcotics addicts.92  The of-
ficer then observed the defendant enter a restaurant, at which point 
the officer approached the defendant and told him to come outside.93  
The officer then said to the defendant, “You know what I am after.”94  
The officer testified that the defendant “mumbled something and 






87 Police Right to “Stop and Frisk,” 82 HARV. L. REV. 178, 178 (1968) [hereinafter Police 
Right]. 
88 See supra section IV.A. 
89 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67-68 (1968). 
90 Id. (reversing in part, but failing to declare the stop and frisk law unconstitutional). 
91 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 543-44. 
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hand into the same pocket, discovering several glassine envelopes, 
which, it turned out, contained heroin.”96 
In Peters, an off duty officer, who was in his apartment that 
he had lived in for the past twelve years, heard a noise at his door.97  
When the officer looked through his peephole, he observed two men 
tiptoeing away from the alcove toward a stairway.98  After calling the 
police, the officer, in regular clothing, gave chase.99  The officer sub-
sequently apprehended the defendant.100  After patting down the de-
fendant for weapons, the officer “discovered a hard object in his 
pocket.”101  When he removed the object, he found an envelope con-
taining burglar’s tools.102  Both Sibron and Peters were convicted.103 
The Supreme Court, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, re-
versed Sibron’s conviction, finding that the officer lacked “probable 
cause to make an arrest” and that the frisk violated the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights because the officer “did not have sufficient 
facts to warrant a belief that [the defendant] was armed and danger-
ous.”104  Significantly, the Court did not invalidate the officer’s stop 
of the defendant, only the subsequent arrest.105  The Court upheld the 
conviction in Peters, finding that the officer had probable cause to 
believe that a crime had been committed.106 
Although the Supreme Court reversed the conviction in 
Sibron, it did so by applying only the Fourth Amendment.107  The 
Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the state stop and 
frisk law.108  However, because the Supreme Court found that the 
stops “did not violate [the defendant’s] Fourth Amendment rights, the 
Court effectively ruled that the law [wa]s not facially unconstitutional 




97 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 48. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 48-49. 
100 Id. at 49. 
101 Id. 
102 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 49. 
103 Id. at 44. 
104 Police Right, supra note 87, at 180-81. 
105 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 544-45. 
106 Police Right, supra note 87, at 181. 
107 Id. at 180. 
108 Id. 
109 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 544. 
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3. People v. De Bour: Clarifying Street 
Encounters 
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, recognizing a level of police 
intrusion less invasive than an arrest requiring probable cause,110 at-
tempted to clarify the controversial stop and frisk law by putting into 
place a four-tier standard for determining if and when an officer can 
approach, inquire, ask accusatory questions, detain, frisk, and make 
an arrest.111  The court developed each tier by evaluating the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio112 and by balancing two of society’s 
competing interests: “ ‘the interest of individuals in living their lives 
free from governmental interference’ and the ‘nondelegable duty 
placed squarely on the shoulders of law enforcement officers to make 
the streets reasonably safe for us all.’ ”113 
As previously discussed in this note, in Terry, the Supreme 
Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment not only applies to ar-
rests, but also to a lower level of police intrusion: the stop and 
frisk.114  Put more clearly, “the police can stop and briefly detain a 
person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable sus-
picion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be 
afoot’ even if the officer lacks probable cause” under the Fourth 
Amendment.115 
As a result of Terry, many have wondered if lower levels of 
intrusions, such as an “officer’s offer of assistance or initial approach 
and questioning of a citizen about his presence in an area” were sub-
ject to constitutional challenges, and if so, what was required before 
officers could engage in these non-forcible stops.116  The Court of 
Appeals provided an answer in De Bour. 
i. The Four Level Standard 
The first level, the request for information, is the most flexible 
 
110 Emily J. Sack, Police Approaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New York: The Af-
termath of People v. De Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV 512, 515 (1991). 
111 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 544-45. 
112 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 575. 
113 Sack, supra note 110, at 512-13. 
114 See supra section IV.A; Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. 
115 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. 
116 Sack, supra note 110, at 515. 
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standard.117  An officer is permitted to approach and request infor-
mation when “there is some objective credible reason for that inter-
ference not necessarily indicative of criminality.”118  The first level 
was based on the belief that the interest of the police, “their public 
service functions” to make and keep the streets reasonably safe, was 
of crucial importance.119  It was further framed around the general 
right to “approach any other person and attempt to strike up a conver-
sation.”120 
The second level, the common law right to inquire, as its 
name indicates, was recognized by the Court of Appeals prior to its 
decision in De Bour.121  “[A] policeman is entitled to interfere with a 
citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information”122 
when there is a “founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”123  
Absent from this level of intrusion is a forcible seizure.124  A forcible 
seizure occurs when an officer confronts an individual and deprives 
him of his ability to walk away.125  The common law right of inquiry 
was recognized and developed because the court believed that 
“commonsense”126 and the overall issue of whether an officer’s ac-
tions were reasonable demanded a level of inquiry that fell between 
the first level’s limited right to approach and the third level’s right to 
seize.127 
The third level, stop and frisk, is a result of New York’s stop 
and frisk statute.128  “Where a police officer entertains a reasonable 
suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing or is 
about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, the C[riminal ]P[rocedure 
]L[aw] authorizes a forcible stop and detention of that person.”129  
With the officer’s right to forcibly stop and detain a person comes the 
 
117 Gennaro Savastano, Court of Appeals of New York: People v. Moore, 23 TOURO L. 
REV. 323, 327 (2007). 
118 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572. 
119 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 545. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
126 David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in 
New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 119 (2013). 
127 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 545-46. 
128 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572. 
129 Id. 
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right to frisk, but only “if the officer reasonably suspects that he is in 
danger of physical injury by virtue of the detainee being armed.”130 
The fourth level, the power to arrest, is based on “probable 
cause.”131  An officer has the authority to make an arrest only when 
probable cause leads him to believe that a “person has committed a 
crime, or offense in his presence”; “probable cause” arises when the 
officer has knowledge of “facts and circumstances” that “warrant a 
prudent person” to believe the suspect is about to, is currently, or has 
committed an offense.132 
B. Bolstering the Court’s Decision in People v. Loretta 
The court’s decision in Loretta lacks detail.  While the court 
was clear in its conclusion, its basis is confined to only a few sen-
tences.133  Specifically, the court’s decision lacks clear reasoning as 
to why the defendant’s conduct constituted a level-two, as opposed to 
a level-three encounter, and why the officer had probable cause to ar-
rest the defendant.134  The court likely found that the officers’ con-
duct constituted a level-two encounter because reasonable suspicion 
cannot be generated based on “[i]nnocuous, or even equivocal behav-
ior.”135  Nervous characteristics, as the defendant in Loretta dis-
played, are common when dealing with the police.  Therefore, the 
court could have viewed the defendant’s conduct as “innocuous” and 
concluded that reasonable suspicion did not arise.136 
In New York, the First Department has ruled that an officer’s 
suspicion that a defendant’s bag contains drugs is worthy of a level-
two encounter.137  Furthermore, select New York courts have stated 
that a “tinfoil packet . . . may be deemed a ‘hallmark’ rather than 
merely a ‘telltale sign’ of criminal drug activity.”138  Specifically, the 
First Department has held that when an officer observes a defendant 




132 Id.; Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). 
133 Loretta, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 2. 
134 Id. at 1. 
135 31 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Procedure § 135 (2013). 
136 Id. 
137 People v. Stevenson, 867 N.Y.S.2d 56 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013). 
138 People v. Alexander, 640 N.Y.S.2d 28 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996). 
139 People v. Scott-Heron, 783 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2004). 
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VI. NEW YORK’S STOP AND FRISK LAW: RACIAL PROFILING 
A. Evidence of Racial Profiling? 
In 1999, Amadou Diallo, an African immigrant, was shot for-
ty-one times by four plain-clothed police officers.140  The officers, 
who were white, approached Diallo because they “believed that he fit 
the description of a rapist.”141  The officers shot at Diallo after he 
reached for his wallet.142 
All four of the officers were acquitted, and in response to pub-
lic backlash, then-Attorney General Eliot Spitzer prepared a report 
documenting the New York Police Department’s (“NYPD”) stop and 
frisk practices in the context of racial profiling.143  The report, which 
analyzed stops that occurred in 1998 and 1999, found “that blacks 
were more than six times more likely to be stopped than whites, and 
Hispanics were more than four times more likely to be stopped than 
whites.”144 
As Spitzer’s report made clear, a higher rate of minority stops 
did not always demonstrate racial bias.145  This is especially evident 
when some data show that minorities commit crimes more often.146  
However, the report further clarified that the correlation could not 
solely be explained by higher crime rates by minorities.147  Using re-
gression analysis, the report concluded, “blacks and Hispanics were 
significantly more likely than whites to be ‘stopped’ after controlling 
for race-specific precinct crime rates and precinct population compo-
sition by race.”148 
In 2006, the NYPD hired Research and Development 
(“RAND”) in response to data that indicated 89% of stops involved 
 
140 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 560. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 561. 
144 Bennett L. Gershman, Use of Race in “Stop-and-Frisk”: Stereotypical Beliefs Linger, 
but How Far Can the Police Go?, 72-APR N.Y. ST. B.J. 42 (2000). 
145 The New York City Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Report to the 
People of the State of New York from the Office of the Attorney General, NEW YORK STATE 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 93 (1999), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/ 
default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk.pdf.  [hereinafter Stop and Frisk Practices: A 
Report]. 
146 Id. at ix. 
147 Kabavoka, supra note 73, at 562. 
148 See Stop and Frisk Practices: A Report, supra note 145, at 121. 
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nonwhites.149  RAND is a “nonprofit institution that helps improve 
policy and decision making through research and analysis.”150  
RAND was hired to determine “first, whether [the data] point[ed] to 
racial bias in police officers’ decisions to stop particular pedestrians, 
and, further, whether [the data] indicate[d] that officers are particular-
ly intrusive when stopping nonwhites.”151 
RAND’s external-benchmarking analysis determined that 
“black pedestrians were stopped at a rate that [wa]s 20 to 30 percent 
lower than their representation in crime-suspect descriptions.  His-
panic pedestrians were stopped disproportionately more, by 5 to 10 
percent, than their representation among crime-suspect descriptions 
would predict.”152  Applying its least reliable benchmark test, RAND 
found “[b]lack pedestrians were stopped at a rate that [wa]s 50 per-
cent greater than their representation in the residential census.  The 
stop rate for Hispanic pedestrians equaled their residential census 
representation.”153 
RAND, however, warned that statistical analyses often “ex-
aggerate racial disparities.”154  As a final conclusion, RAND found 
that its analysis did not eliminate racial disparities, but did indicate 
that the disparities are far lower than the raw data suggested.155 
B. Current Challenges to New York’s Stop and Frisk 
Law 
In 2011, plaintiffs David Floyd and David Ourlicht brought a 
class action lawsuit against the City of New York, Police Commis-
sioner Raymond Kelly, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and New York 
City Police Officers, “alleging that defendants h[ad] implemented 
and sanctioned a policy, practice, and/or custom of unconstitutional 
stops and frisks by the NYPD on the basis of race and/or national 
 
149 Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial Disparities in the New York Police Department’s 
Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices, RAND.ORG xi, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/p 
ubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR534.sum.pdf (last visited May 2, 2014). 
150 About the RAND Corporation, RAND.ORG, http://www.rand.org/about.html (last visit-
ed May 2, 2014). 
151 Ridgeway, supra note 149. 
152 Id. at xii. 
153 Id. at xi. 
154 Id. at xiv. 
155 Id. at xi. 
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origin.”156 
In February of 2008, David Floyd, an African-American man, 
testified that while walking in his neighborhood, he passed a man, 
who Floyd believed was locked out of his home.157  The man was al-
so African-American.158  Floyd’s godmother owned the building, and 
as a result, Floyd was able to go upstairs and receive between seven 
and ten keys, which would potentially unlock the door and give the 
man access to his home.159  Before Floyd could open the door, three 
NYPD officers approached Floyd and the tenant.160  The officers 
asked Floyd and the tenant “what they were doing, told them to stop,” 
and subsequently frisked them.161  All three officers testified that they 
believed Floyd was committing a burglary.162 
Approximately five months later, in June of 2008, David 
Ourlicht, an African-American man, was approached and searched by 
more than four police officers, after they had received a report of a 
man with a gun in the area.163  Ourlicht had been sitting outside of a 
housing project in Harlem, New York.164  When the officers finished 
searching the housing project, they approached Ourlicht and forced 
him to lie on the ground.165  After Ourlicht had been lying on the 
ground for close to ten minutes, the officers asked him and the other 
men he was with for their names and identification.166  The NYPD 
was not able to present any evidence that the police received a call or 
report of a gun in the area.167  Nor was a gun ever recovered.168  
Ourlicht further alleged that all of the officers on the scene were 
white males.169 
Judge Scheindlin held, in regard to the February 2008 inci-
dent, that “the officers were justified in their reasonable suspicion” to 
 
156 Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd I), 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), on 
reconsideration, 813 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 




161 Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 424. 
162 Id. at 424-25. 
163 Id. at 427. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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search Floyd.170  Scheindlin believed that the combination of the of-
ficers’ awareness of a “midday burglary pattern in the neighbor-
hood,” and Floyd and the tenant’s nervous mannerisms “create[d] 
enough reasonable suspicion to justify the officers briefly detaining 
the men for an investigatory stop.”171  Furthermore, the frisk was jus-
tified because the officers had suspected the two men of committing 
the crime of burglary.172  The frisk was also necessary to protect the 
safety of the officers.173 
Following this decision, the plaintiffs filed a motion to rein-
state Floyd’s claims arising out of his February 2008 stop and frisk.174  
The motion was a result of new evidence put forward by the plaintiff 
that challenged the existence of a burglary pattern.175  The court 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion to reinstate Floyd’s claim, holding that 
the existence of a burglary pattern was a genuine issue of material 
fact.176  The court further denied the defendants’ argument that even 
in the absence of a burglary pattern, “the officers nonetheless had 
reasonable suspicion to stop Floyd.”177 
In regard to the June 2008 incident, Judge Scheindlin denied 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.178  Judge Scheindlin 
held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that officers must have 
reasonable individualized articulable suspicion that an individual is 
armed and dangerous before frisking him.”179  A general report of a 
gun, Judge Scheindlin stated, did not support reasonable individual-
ized articulable suspicion “to stop and frisk any individual in the ar-
ea.”180 
In August of 2013, approximately five years after the Febru-
ary and June incidents, Judge Scheindlin declared New York’s stop 
and frisk policy unconstitutional because it violated the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.181  Scheindlin found that individuals were 
 
170 Id. at 443. 
171 Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44. 
172 Id. at 444. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 459. 
175 Id. 
176 Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
177 Id. at 469. 
178 Id. at 444. 
179 Id. at 445. 
180 Id. 
181 Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd II), 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), ap-
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stopped because of their race and without any reasonable suspicion as 
required by Terry v. Ohio.182  These determinations were made from 
a statistical analysis of close to 4.5 million stops in New York City 
from 2004 to 2012.183 
In November of 2013, the United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit, was forced to reassign the case to a different district 
court judge.184  This decision was made after Judge Scheindlin made 
statements that the court believed compromised her impartiality.185  
Following the case’s reassignment, the City of New York filed a mo-
tion seeking to vacate Scheindlin’s decision in August of 2013.186  
This motion was denied.187 
Bill de Blasio, the current democratic mayor of New York 
City, who assumed office in January of 2014, stated during his cam-
paign, “he would drop objections to the decision, which had called 
for a monitor to oversee major changes to the police tactic.”188  How-
ever, in late December of 2013, de Blasio gave a scare to stop and 
frisk opposition activists when he appointed Bill Bratton, a stop and 
frisk supporter,189 as the new police commissioner.190  Feeling the 
heat, NYPD Union lawyers, in January of 2014, filed legal papers re-
questing that the Court of Appeals speed up its determination as to 
 
peal dismissed (Sept. 25, 2013). 
182 Vidisha Barua Worley, Terry Stops: Reasonable Suspicion or Just a Hunch?, 49 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 10 (2013). 
183 Rudovsky, supra note 126, at 118. 
184 Ligon v. City of New York (Ligon I), 736 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2013). 
185 Id.  In a proceeding involving another case, Scheindlin stated, “if you got proof of in-
appropriate racial profiling in a good constitutional case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit?  
You can certainly mark it as related.”  Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101, 103 
n.1 (2d Cir. 2013), superseded in part, 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part, No. 13-
3123-CV, 2014 WL 667358 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2014).  She also added, “[w]hat I am trying to 
say, I am sure I am going to get in trouble for saying it, for $65 you can bring that lawsuit.”  
Id.  She later continued, “[a]nd as I said before, I would accept it as a related case, which the 
plaintiff has the power to designate.”  Id. 
186 Ligon v. City of New York (Ligon II), 736 F.3d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 2013). 
187 Id. 
188 Colleen Long & Larry Neumeister, NYC’s Appeal of Stop-And-Frisk Ruling Could Be 
Dropped If De Blasio Elected Mayor, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2013, 9:32 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/01/stop-and-frisk-appeal-de-blasio-
_n_4189961.html. 
189 Saki Knafo, Bill Bratton, Stop-And-Frisk Architect, Takes Over Nation's Biggest Po-
lice Force, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201 
4/01/02/bill-bratton-sworn-in_n_4533202.html. 
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whether Scheindlin’s controversial decision would be struck down as 
a result of partiality.191 
In late January of 2014, one month into his term as mayor of 
New York City, de Blasio agreed to withdraw the city’s appeal of the 
Second Circuit’s controversial decision.192  As required by the Se-
cond Circuit, de Blasio agreed to the appointment of a monitor to 
foresee the necessary steps to end stop and frisk related discrimina-
tion.193  The withdrawal was part of the mayor’s “collective commit-
ment to fix the fundamental problems that enabled stop-and-frisk to 
grow out of control and violate the rights of innocent New York-
ers.”194  It has yet to be seen if de Blasio will simply adhere to the Se-
cond Circuit’s prescription or whether he will embrace the court’s 
decision and take further steps that may help to put an end to discrim-
inatory police practices.195  For now, however, de Blasio must cope 
with five police unions, including the “Patrolmen’s Benevolent Asso-
ciation and unions representing sergeants, captains, detectives and 
lieutenants,” which have asked the Second Circuit to prevent with-
drawal of the appeal.196  The unions argued that the decision “would 
unfairly taint the integrity of the police force and re-write rules gov-
erning officer conduct.”197 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While the federal and state approaches used to determine the 
justification for police conduct vary, both are used to ensure the safe-
 
191 Rich Calder, NYPD union lawyers seek quicker stop-frisk appeal ruling, N.Y. POST 
(Jan. 2, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/01/02/nypd-union-lawyers-seek-quicker-
stop-frisk-appeal-ruling/. 
192 Stop-And-Frisk Appeal Dropped By Mayor De Blasio, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 
2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/30/stop-and-frisk-appeal-dropped-
mayor-de-blasio_n_4695930.html. 
193 Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on 




196 John Riley, Police unions act to pursue stop-and-frisk appeal, NEWSDAY (Feb. 7, 2014, 
3:48 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/police-unions-act-to-pursue-stop-and-frisk-
appeal-1.6981485. 
197 NYC Police Unions File Motion To Intervene In Stop-And-Frisk Dispute: Unions Want 
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ty of police officers.  Furthermore, both standards appropriately bal-
ance the fundamental right of privacy with the necessary actions a 
police officer must take to protect and promote the safety of those 
they vowed to serve and protect.  Although at times, issues arise re-
garding the constitutionality of some of the methods applied by vari-
ous departments, cities, and states, an arbitrary line has to be drawn 
somewhere in order to efficiently balance both the privacy concerns 







 Touro Law, J.D. Candidate (2015); University at Albany, B.A. (2012).  Special Thanks: To 
my family and friends for their patience and support over the years.  To Tara Breslawski and 
Professor Rena Seplowitz for their time and guidance on this case note. 
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 4, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/13
